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The Context of Violence
THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT
& INTERPRETIVE ISSUES IN THE
GUN CONTROL ACT
INTRODUCTION
On October 18, 2009, Stephen Voisine used his
Remington Model 7400 to shoot and kill a bald eagle.1 His crime,
punishable as a federal offense,2 was not his first brush with the
law. Years prior, a Maine district court convicted Voisine of
assaulting his girlfriend, a crime classified as a “misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence.”3 Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), a
federal law more commonly known as the “Lautenberg
Amendment,”4 Voisine’s assault conviction barred him from the
current and future possession of a firearm.5 When Voisine was
later federally indicted for killing a national symbol,6 he was also
1 Information, United States v. Voisine, 2011 WL 1458666 (D. Me. Apr. 14,
2011), (No. 1:11-CR-00017-JAW) (hereinafter Voisine Information); Rachel Louise
Snyder, The Court Slams the Door on Domestic Abusers Owning Guns, NEW YORKER,
June 30, 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-court-slams-the-door-
on-domestic-abusers-owning-guns [https://perma.cc/P7JL-UBZM].
2 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2012) (imposing criminal penalties of a fine of “not more
than $5,000,” or up to one year of imprisonment for “knowingly, or with wanton disregard”
taking or possessing “any bald eagle commonly known as the American Eagle”).
3 Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2272–76 (2016) Voisine was
convicted under Section 207 of the Maine Criminal Code for “intentionally, knowingly
or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.” ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 207(1)(A) (2004). A brief note on language: in several of the
sources cited, a misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence is alternatively referred to
by its acronym as an “MCDV” offense.
4 See Melanie C. Schneider, The Imprecise Draftsmanship of the Lautenberg
Amendment and the Resulting Problems for the Judiciary, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L
505, 505 (2008) (“In 1996, Congress passed the Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban
(‘Lautenberg Amendment’), a controversial Amendment to the Gun Control Act.” (citing
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9))).
5 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9); Voisine Information, supra note 1; Snyder, supra note 1.
6 U. S. FISH &WILDLIFE SERV., BALD EAGLE: HALIAEETUS LEUCOCEPHALUS 1
(2007), https://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/pdf/management/bald-eagle-fact-sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YYQ3-NJ65] (The bald eagle was first adopted “as the national
symbol in 1782.”).
1442 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:4
charged with illegal possession of a firearm under the
Lautenberg Amendment.7
Prior to the passage of the Lautenberg Amendment, the
Gun Control Act of 1968 allowed defendants charged with a
misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence to legally
purchase firearms, whereas defendants charged with a felony
conviction were barred.8 This loophole was particularly
dangerous because of the frequency with which domestic
violence defendants pleaded down to misdemeanor
convictions—and the deadly connection between domestic
abuse and firearms.9 Sponsored by Senator Lautenberg of New
Jersey,10 the amendment serves two primary functions: first, it
prohibits the “possession of firearms by persons convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” and second, it bans
the “sale or disposition of any firearm” to such persons.11
The outcome of a defendant’s Lautenberg Amendment
charge turns on whether a court, looking at the predicate
crime, finds a defendant’s conviction to be a “misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence.”12 Courts have used a variety of
approaches13 to determine whether the underlying
misdemeanor conduct falls within the scope of the Lautenberg
Amendment.14 In particular, courts look to the Lautenberg
Amendment’s force clause, which specifies that a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence must have “as an element [ ] the use
or attempted use of physical force.”15
7 Voisine Information, supra note 1; Conditional Plea, United States v.
Voisine, 2011 WL 1458666 (D. Me. Apr. 14, 2011), (No. 1:11-CR-00017-JAW).
8 See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 658(b)(2), 110 Stat. 3009, 3372 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)
(2012)); 142 CONG. REC. S10377–78 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg); See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1968) (enacting the Unlawful Acts section of the
Gun Control Act prohibited convicted felons from possession of a firearm but did not
prohibit misdemeanants).
9 Id.; see also Tom Lininger, An Ethical Duty to Charge Batterers
Appropriately, 22 DUKE J. GENDER L. POL’Y 173, 191–93 (2015) (noting the common
practice of undercharging or accepting plea agreements for defendants accused of
committing crimes of domestic violence).
10 S. 1632, 104th Cong. (1996).
11 T.J. HALSTEAD, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: FIREARMS PROHIBITIONS
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONVICTIONS: THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT (2001),
http://mchenry.house.gov/uploadedfiles/second%20amend%20-%20firearms%20prohibitions
%20and%20domestic%20violence%20convictions%20the%20lautenberg%20amendment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QKU3-2DWN].
12 See Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2278 (“Reckless assaults, no less than the
knowing or intentional ones we addressed in Castleman, satisfy that definition.
Further, Congress enacted § 922(g)(9) in order to prohibit domestic abusers convicted
under run-of-the-mill misdemeanor assault and battery laws from possessing guns.”).
13 See infra Section II.B.
14 Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2276–77.
15 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(ii).
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Voisine’s subsequent unsuccessful challenge to the
court’s application of the Lautenberg Amendment’s force
clause, and the classification of his crime as one that triggers
it, was the subject of the Supreme Court’s Voisine v. United
States decision.16 In Voisine, the Court looked to whether
Voisine’s assault conviction, which included a reckless mens
rea, qualified as a “use of force.”17 Previously, in United States
v. Castleman, the Court had ruled that an assault conviction—
although not committed with force traditionally deemed
“violent”—with an intentional or knowledgeable mens rea,
triggered the amendment’s force clause.18 In a 6–2 decision, the
Voisine Court went a step further than Castleman and upheld
Voisine’s conviction, widening the scope of the Lautenberg
Amendment’s applicability to underlying misdemeanor crimes
of domestic violence committed with a reckless mind.19
The government is now asking circuit and district courts
to construe Voisine’s holding beyond the realm of domestic
violence law and to another section of the Gun Control Act.20
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), a sentencing
enhancement within the Gun Control Act, penalizes a
defendant who has three prior violent felony convictions
further by enhancing his sentence to a minimum of fifteen
years imprisonment.21 In the aftermath of Voisine, district and
circuit courts have repeatedly had to address whether the
expanded required mens rea of crimes that trigger the
Lautenberg Amendment qualify under the ACCA
enhancement.22 Some courts have decided to cabin Voisine’s
16 Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2276.
17 Id. at 2278–79.
18 Lininger, supra note 9 at 177 (arguing that United States v. Castleman
substantially widens the applicability of the Lautenberg Amendment, but does not
substantially support or change its level of enforcement); see also United States v.
Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1411–12 (2014).
19 Rory Little, Opinion analysis: Federal “use of force” encompasses
reckless domestic violence misdemeanor offenses, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2016, 9:08
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-federal-use-of-force-encompasses-
reckless-domestic-violence-misdemeanor-offenses/ [https://perma.cc/C6H5-H8YL] (reporting
on the Castleman decision); Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2281; Elisabeth Ponsot, Under US law,
convicted domestic abusers cannot buy guns, QUARTZ (Oct. 4, 2017), https://qz.com/1094713/
las-vegas-shooting-what-is-the-lautenberg-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/356B-UDMQ].
20 Compare Bennett v. United States, No. 1:16-CV-251-GZS, 2016 WL
3676145, at *3 (D. Me. July 6, 2016) (order granting motion for relief), with United
States v. Fogg, 836 F.3d 951, 956 (8th Cir. 2016); See also United States v. Wehunt,
230 F. Supp. 3d 838, 845–46 (E.D. Tenn. 2017) (evaluating the government’s argument
that courts should “extend[ ] Voisine’s interpretation of the term ‘use’ to the ACCA
and/or the career offender enhancement.”); See infra Part III.
21 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
22 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a); See Fogg, 836 F.3d. at 956 (“Reckless conduct thus
constitutes a ‘use’ of force under the ACCA because the force clauses in 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) and the ACCA both define qualifying predicate offenses as those
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holding to the domestic violence realm, while others have
engaged in interpretive spillover and applied it to the ACCA.23
Given the seriousness of an ACCA enhancement and the
important and burgeoning circuit split, the time has come for
novel legislation or Supreme Court clarification.
By analyzing the tensions underlying current Supreme
Court domestic violence jurisprudence, this note proposes that
the inconsistent mens rea requirements of the predicate crimes
contemplated by the Lautenberg Amendment and the ACCA be
kept separate. Part I looks to rationales and theories
underpinning the modern jurisprudence of domestic violence
issues, and the importance of congressional action in this area
of the law. Part II examines the Lautenberg Amendment and
its interpretation through the Supreme Court decisions in
United States v. Hayes, Castleman, and Voisine.24 This Part
further highlights the shift of Justice Sotomayor from the
author of the unanimous 2014 Castleman decision to that of a
dissenter in the 2016 Voisine decision.25 Part III then focuses
on whether the Court’s interpretation of the force clause of the
Lautenberg Amendment should be extended to the force clause
in the ACCA. In order to avoid interpretation beyond
congressional intent, Part IV argues that an addition to the
Lautenberg Amendment’s definitional section would strengthen
its statutory application and clarify the law, while denying the
same interpretation to other sections of the Gun Control Act.
The history and context of domestic violence allows for a more
liberal reading of statutes, but does not set forth universal
principles to extend to other sentencing regimes.
I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A LEGAL ISSUE
A review of domestic violence concepts illuminates the
principles and application of the Lautenberg Amendment, as
well as how the Supreme Court arrived at its interpretive
decisions.26 A substantial body of theory and law underpin the
involving the ‘use . . . of physical force’ against another.”); United States v. Taylor, 272
F. Supp. 3d 127, 146 (D.D.C. 2017) (“The Court notes that in reaching this conclusion,
it reaches a contrary holding to some other courts addressing this issue.”).
23 Id.
24 United States v. Voisine, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016); Castleman, 134 S. Ct.
1405; United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009).
25 Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2282 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Castleman, 134 S. Ct.
at 1408; Little, supra note 19 (reviewing the Voisine v. United States decision).
26 See Emily J. Sack, United States v. Castleman: The Meaning of Domestic
Violence, 20 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 128, 129 (2015) (arguing that the Court’s
decision in Castleman imports language of domestic violence advocates and could have
effects beyond the dispossession statute).
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Supreme Court decisions that make up its domestic violence
jurisprudence.27 First, the evolution of spousal abuse from
traditionally acceptable to criminally liable behavior evidences the
changing cultural recognition of harmful behavior that
overwhelmingly affects women, children, and the disenfranchised.28
Furthermore, this now criminally liable behavior becomes more
dangerous once firearms are involved and necessitates
regulation.29 Lastly, in addition to state laws that create
criminal liability for domestic violence, Congress has created
important federal laws, including the Lautenberg Amendment,
to address these issues.
A. Overview of the Criminalization of Family Violence
Although violence has always been used as a means of
coercion and control, in the context of a domestic relationship,
the specter of violence takes on a different dimension.30
Historically, courts turned a blind eye to the subversion of women
and family members, even allowing for violence committed in the
home to be “immun[e]” from assault and battery charges.31
Traditionally, Anglo-American common law allowed a
husband, as “master of his household” to physically discipline
his wife, provided “he did not inflict permanent injury upon
her.”32 Although ideas about domestic physical abuse began to
change with the temperance movement of the 1920s, the
contemporary women’s movement of the 1970s was able to
27 See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996) (providing an exhaustive review of the history
of domestic violence from unacknowledged problem to criminally liable behavior).
28 See id. at 2120–21.
29 See Brief of Everytown for Gun Safety as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 2, Voisine, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016). (No. 14-10154) (citing Jacquelyn C.
Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a
Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1089–97 (July 2003)
(discussing the harrowing statistics of when guns are present in situations of domestic
violence) [hereinafter Everytown Brief].
30 Mary Fan, Disarming the Dangerous: Preventing Extraordinary and
Ordinary Violence, 90 IND. L.J. 151, 156 (2014–2015) (“While the current regulatory
focus is on preventing violence from the armed deranged stranger hunting in schools,
businesses, and on the street, nearly half of all incidents of firearms-related homicide
take place in the home. The majority of firearms homicides with known victim-
perpetrator circumstances are perpetrated by people the victim knew. Even when it
comes to the seemingly most extreme form of extraordinary violence—the homicidal-
suicidal—the clearest warning signs entail incidents of ordinary violence. This Article
presents data revealing that a substantial proportion of high-risk actors who go on to
commit homicide-suicides have a history of assaults and domestic disturbances but
have never been in court. In contrast, a much smaller proportion of homicidal-suicidal
shooters could have been caught by focusing on mental-health red flags.”).
31 Siegel, supra note 27, at 2118.
32 Id.
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effectively challenge these ideologies and bring about the
modern understanding that physical discipline of a spouse is,
in fact, abusive violence.33 Victims of domestic abuse can now
seek out battered women’s shelters, participate in specialized
arrest procedures, and have gained federal recognition through
the Violence Against Women Act, a federal statute that
penalizes gender-based crime.34
In its landmark Planned Parenthood v. Casey decision,
the Supreme Court “recognized the pervasiveness and severity
of intimate violence for the first time.”35 In turn, Justice
O’Connor upheld and overruled several Pennsylvania
restrictions on abortion.36 In a surprisingly passionate section,
the Court overturned the spousal notification provision of the
law.37 This provision banned doctors from “perform[ing] an
abortion on a married woman without receiving a signed
statement from the woman that she ha[d] notified her spouse
that she [was] about to undergo an abortion.”38 The Court found
that this provision would place an undue burden on women and
would mean that those “who faced intimate violence, and who
could not tell their partner that they were pregnant without
fear of harm, would be unable to freely exercise their
reproductive choice.”39 This aspect of the Casey decision,
grounded in research, statistics,40 and empathy, provided
jurisprudential recognition from the country’s highest court
that when in tension with criminally violent conduct, women’s
voices would not be suppressed.
The Court’s language could be seen as an early
indication of a more informed understanding of domestic
violence, and directly leading to the Court’s evaluation of the
Lautenberg Amendment.41 Notably, the Supreme Court’s later
33 See id. at 2170–71.
34 See id. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 102-322, 108 Stat.
1796; see Siegel, supra note 27, at 2171–72; Jane K. Stoever, Mirandizing Family
Justice, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 189, 198–99 (2016) (examining the modern state of
the domestic violence social welfare system).
35 Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–88 (1992);
ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 3 (2000) (discussing
the history of domestic violence jurisprudence through the lens of critical legal theory).
36 Casey, 505 U.S. at 897–98.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 SCHNEIDER, supra note 35, at 3.
40 Casey, 505 U.S. at 891–92 (“Where the husband is the father, the primary
reason women do not notify their husbands is that the husband and wife are experiencing
marital difficulties, often accompanied by incidents of violence.” (citation omitted)).
41 See infra Section II.B (discussing the Court’s interpretation of the
Lautenberg Amendment to include the language regarding violence supported by
domestic violence advocacy groups); See also Megan L. Bumb, Domestic Violence Law,
2018] THE CONTEXT OF VIOLENCE 1447
adoption in Castleman that “‘[d]omestic violence’ is not merely a
type of ‘violence’; it is a term of art encompassing acts that one
might not characterize as ‘violent’ in a nondomestic context,” has
its basis in Casey’s language of coercion and freedom.42
B. The Importance of Dispossession
Against this framework of punishing abusers’ intents
and actions, policy makers have sought out ways to further
limit harm to intimate partners and those likely to be the
subject of abuse.43 Access to guns in a household with a history
of domestic abuse raises the stakes for victims of the abuse.
Studies confirm that the presence of a firearm in a home with a
background of domestic violence is the “single most accurate
predictor” of homicide.44 Women disproportionately bear the
brunt of this burden, and in 2013, “53% of female victims of
intimate partner homicide were killed with firearms.”45 A history
of domestic abuse coupled with firearm access is an almost
incendiary combination, where “[a] firearm in the home
quintuples the risk that an individual with a history of domestic
violence will subsequently murder an intimate partner.”46
Additionally, an individual with a history of domestic
abuse can be largely tied to not only violence in the home, but
also outside of it.47 In an analysis of mass shootings, more than
Abusers’ Intent, and Social Media: How Transaction-Bound Statutes Are the True
Threats to Prosecuting Perpetrators of Gender-Based Violence, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 917,
932–35 (2017) (discussing how the societal “changing awareness” of domestic violence
issues affects congressional legislation and Supreme Court jurisprudence); See also
United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1409 (2014).
42 Sack, supra note 26, at 141–42 (emphasis in original) (quoting Castleman,
134 S. Ct., at 1411–12); Sandra Tibbetts Murphy, Supreme Court Says Federal Gun
Ban Includes “Reckless” Domestic Assault, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & FIREARMS
RESOURCE CTR. (July 1, 2016), http://www.preventdvgunviolence.org/news/voisine-vs-
united-states.html [https://perma.cc/MR7Z-2W5D].
43 Joan Meier, Voisine v. United States: The Supreme Court Just Says No—
Again—to Domestic Abusers Seeking to Possess Firearms, GEO. WASH. L. REV.: ON THE
DOCKET (June 30, 2016), https://www.gwlr.org/voisine-v-united-states-the-supreme-
court-just-says-no-again-to-domestic-abusers-seeking-to-possess-firearms/ [https://
perma.cc/G7CT-9JTR].
44 Lininger, supra note 9, at 177.
45 Brief Amici Curiae of Major Cities Chiefs and The Int’l Brotherhood of
Police Officers Supporting Respondent at 7, Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272
(2016), (No. 14-10154) (citing data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation).
46 Everytown Brief, supra note 29, at 2 (citing Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al.,
Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case
Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1089–97 (2003)).
47 See MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, ANALYSIS OF RECENT MASS
SHOOTINGS 4 (2013), http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/9/56/4/1242/1/analysis-of-
recent-mass-shootings.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD7F-9QLQ] (“There was a noteworthy
connection between mass shooting incidents and domestic or family violence. In at
least 53 of the [93] cases [studied] (57%), the shooter killed a current or former spouse
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half of the incidents included victims who were former spouses,
intimate partners, or family members of the perpetrator.48 Of
that number, at least 32 percent of the shooters had a history
of domestic violence.49 Whereas politicians and public figures
often focus on the “mental health” of the gunman after a mass
shooting,50 given these statistics, one scholar finds that the
focus should instead be on gun reduction for those convicted of
domestic violence.51
Even in shootings that do not involve intimate partners
or family members, a history of domestic violence is often an
indicator for future violence.52 Our understanding that
domestic violence should be treated as “‘ordinary’ violence” and
should not implicate future “extraordinary violence” is thus
unfounded.53 In the United States, where 36 percent of
households have guns,54 gun violence disproportionately affects
women and families, and a history of abuse can even be linked
to mass shootings,55 American legislatures have an imperative
duty to regulate and prevent gun access to domestic abusers.
C. Congressional Action: The Lautenberg Amendment
A host of federal remedies and doctrines exist to target
violence against women and domestic violence as a legally
redressable ill. Remedies range from bankruptcy laws to
or intimate partner or other family member, and in at least 17 incidents the shooter
had a prior domestic violence charge.”).
48 Id. at 2, 4. To note, a mass shooting is defined by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation as “any incident where at least four people were murdered with a gun.” Id.
49 Id. at 4. This number has surely changed since the Mayor’s Report was
published in 2013, although sadly the numbers may have only worsened. During the
time it took to write and publish this note, many more horrific mass shootings
occurred—all undertaken by shooters with a criminal or public history of domestic
violence. To catalogue these atrocities would require a separate research paper and I
will not attempt to do so here. See Max de Haldevang, Stephen Paddock shared a trait
with other mass killers: He abused women, QUARTZ (OCT. 4, 2017),
https://qz.com/1094160/las-vegas-shooter-stephen-paddock-abused-women-just-like-
other-mass-killers-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/539Y-GU9M].
50 The Editorial Board, Don’t Blame Mental Illness for Gun Violence, N.Y.
TIMES: OPINION PAGES, Dec. 16, 2015, at A34, http://nyti.ms/1P6EHro
[https://perma.cc/GWZ7-XZGG].
51 Fan, supra note 30, at 165–69 (evaluating data from the Center for Disease
Control’s National Violent Death Reporting System and finding that “[p]rior studies
have found that intimate-partner conflict and domestic-violence history are major risk
factors for homicide-suicides.”).
52 See id.
53 Id. at 166.
54 See Christopher Ingraham, Gun ownership in the US is at a 40-year low,
but gun purchases are at an all-time high, WORLD ECON. F. (July 7, 2016),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/07/gun-ownership-in-the-us-is-at-a-40-year-low-
but-gun-purchases-are-at-an-all-time-high [https://perma.cc/5GYX-TTVR].
55 SeeMAYORS AGAINST ILLEGALGUNS, supra note 47.
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potential exceptions to the threat doctrine under the First
Amendment, to the overarching reforms within the Violence
Against Women Act.56 The Lautenberg Amendment is born
from this background.
On the heels of the widely supported Violence Against
Women Act,57 Congress passed the Domestic Violence Offender
Gun Ban, also known as the Lautenberg Amendment.58 An
amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968, the Lautenberg
Amendment is a federal ban on gun possession by anyone
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.59 The
amendment was intended to “close [a] dangerous loophole”
where many state criminal laws classified domestic violence as
a misdemeanor and not a felony.60 Significantly, a felony
conviction would automatically bar a person from firearm
possession, however, a misdemeanor conviction would not.61 In
practice this meant that when a defendant accused of felony
domestic violence instead pleaded guilty to a lesser
misdemeanor charge in order to expedite the legal process, the
now-convicted person was not barred from firearm possession.62
As a result, those with misdemeanor convictions of domestic
violence could purchase firearms unencumbered. Given the
strong correlation between domestic violence murders and
firearms,63 Senator Lautenberg called on his fellow senators to
“establish a policy of zero tolerance when it comes to guns and
domestic violence,” in order to signal that family violence was
taken “as seriously as other forms of brutal behavior.”64 The
56 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(v) (2012) (The automatic stay, which bars
creditors from seeking money or a host of other remedies from the debtor, does not
allow for a petition to operate as a stay against “the commencement or continuation of
a civil action or proceeding . . . regarding domestic violence”); Elonis v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 2001, 2023–24 (2015); see Bumb, supra note 41, at 946–47; see generally
Factsheet: The Violance Against Women Act, OBAMAWHITEHOUSE.ARCHIVES.GOV,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/vawa_factsheet.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TF3L-JBQ9] (The federal government approved sweeping measures that helped
prosecutors and communities maintain domestic violence dockets, and assisted with
victim services, by increasing federal funding for rape kit testing and access to services.).
57 Id.
58 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 658(b)(2), 110 Stat. 3009, 3372 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012)).
59 Id.
60 142 CONG. REC. S10377-78 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
61 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012) (criminalizes possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, or a person “who has been convicted in any court of, a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”)
62 142 CONG. REC. S10, 377–78 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg). To note, the practice of pleading to a lesser crime in exchange for a lighter
sentence is more commonly known as plea bargaining. Id.
63 Everytown Brief, supra note 29, at 2.
64 142 CONG. REC. S10, 377–78.
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amendment was eventually passed by a Senate vote of 97–2,65
signaling strong congressional support for Senator
Lautenberg’s sentiments.
II. THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Lautenberg Amendment is constructed of both a
punitive section banning the possession or sale of firearms by a
person convicted of a misdemeanor conviction of domestic
violence,66 and a definitional section outlining the required
element (the force clause) and relationship (the relationship
requirement) of an underlying conviction.67 The definitional
section broadly construes the requirements for the predicate
misdemeanor conviction, and since misdemeanors vary by
state, statutory interpretation plays a large role in deciding
what type of conduct the federal government can punish.68 By
looking at the statutory text, concepts of domestic violence
jurisprudence, and congressional history, the Supreme Court
has interpreted the Lautenberg Amendment on three
significant occasions.69
A. Context and Practice: The Relationship Requirement
The relationship requirement of the Lautenberg
Amendment,70 which describes what types of intimate partner
65 See Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
525, 553 (2003).
66 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who
has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any
firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”).
67 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (defining an applicable offense as “a
misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law” that includes “an element, the use or
attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed
by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with
whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has
cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly
situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.”).
68 See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 426–27 (2009) (“Construing
§ 922(g)(9) to exclude the domestic abuser convicted under a generic use-of-force
statute would frustrate Congress’ manifest purpose.”).
69 See Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2279–80 (2016); Hayes, 555
U.S. at 415, 421; United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1410 (2014); See also
Melissa Jeltsen, Supreme Court Affirms That Even ‘Reckless’ Domestic Abusers Should
Lose Gun Rights, HUFFINGTON POST (June 27, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/supreme-court-domestic-violence-gun-rights_us_5771293fe4b0dbb1bbbb0e63
[https://perma.cc/969R-2JMD].
70 See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (A misdemeanor conviction of domestic
violence includes an element of force by “a person with whom the victim shares a child
in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a
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and family relationships can give rise to a misdemeanor
conviction of domestic violence, was the subject of the Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion in United States vs. Hayes.71 In Hayes, the
Court found that the predicate offense did not need to have as
“a discrete element” a domestic relationship requirement in
order to qualify as a domestic violence misdemeanor.72 Justice
Ginsburg looked to the structure and syntax of the Lautenberg
Amendment to come to this conclusion.73 Finding that the
government was required to establish the fact of a domestic
relationship beyond a reasonable doubt in order to successfully
prosecute under the Lautenberg Amendment, Justice Ginsburg
rejected the argument that the government should rely solely
on the relationship element in the predicate offense.74
Additional practical motivations supported the Hayes
opinion.75 Many domestic violence misdemeanors are charged
as general assault and not specifically as a domestic violence
assault.76 At the time of the enactment, domestic violence-
specific statutes were rare, and most states continued to
prosecute under general assault and battery laws.77 Requiring
a relationship element, and not just a fact, in the underlying
conviction would render the amendment a “‘dead letter’ in some
two-thirds of the States from the very moment of its
enactment.”78 By requiring the government to engage in limited
fact-finding in order to prove a domestic relationship beyond a
reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court upheld the challenge to
the Lautenberg Amendment in Hayes and set the precedent
that a contextual statutory interpretation governed.79
spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or
guardian of the victim.”).
71 Hayes, 555 U.S. at 415.
72 Id. at 421–22.
73 Id. at 421–23. Notably, Justice Ginsburg did not apply the categorical
approach—a method of statutory interpretation that looks only to the elements, and
not the facts, of a prior offense to see if it triggers the current federal charge. See also
Rebecca Sharpless, Finally, A True Elements Test: Mathis v. United States and the
Categorical Approach, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1275, 1279–83 (2017) (a clear-eyed
explanation of how the Court uses the “categorical approach” to remain blind to the
facts below or the “modified categorical approach” to “ascertain whether a criminal
conviction qualifies as a predicate offense for a federal consequence”). In dissent, Chief
Justice Roberts criticized this approach, arguing that the Court should use the
categorical approach and look to the statutory elements, just as they had done in
previous cases interpreting the ACCA. Hayes, 55 U.S. at 436 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
74 Hayes, 55 U.S. at 426.
75 See id. at 427–28 (“Practical considerations strongly support our reading of
§ 921(a)(33)(A)’s language.”).
76 Id.
77 See id. at 427–28.
78 Id.
79 Legislators continue to seek an expansion of the relationship requirement
to include the evolving cultural understanding of families. Identical bills have been
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B. Interpretation and Congressional Intent: The Force
Clause
In two later cases, the Supreme Court interpreted
Lautenberg Amendment’s force clause, alternatively known as
the elements cause, which requires that the applicable predicate
offense must include as “an element, the use or attempted use of
physical force.”80 First, in United States v. Castleman, Justice
Sotomayor,81 writing for a unanimous court, interpreted the
underlying misdemeanor conviction element of the Lautenberg
Amendment to include convictions predicated on “intentionally
or knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury to” a domestic partner as
fulfilling the force clause’s requirement.82 Castleman argued that
his misdemeanor conviction did not involve “violent force,” and
thus should not be eligible as a predicate conviction.83 The
Supreme Court, however, found that in the context of domestic
violence, the common-law definition of force captured the type of
conduct in Castleman’s predicate conviction, making him eligible
for a Lautenberg Amendment charge.84
Two years later, in Voisine v. United States, Justice
Kagan, writing for a 6–2 majority, again upheld the validity of
a broad reading of the Lautenberg Amendment’s force clause.85
The defendant argued that his predicate misdemeanor
conviction, which allowed for a conviction based on a
“recklessly” caused bodily injury, did not suffice as a predicate
for his Lautenberg Amendment charge.86 Once more using the
Castleman method of evaluating congressional intent and
introduced in the House and the Senate that would widen the relationship requirement
to include current and former dating partners, who may be unmarried and not living
together, or stalking misdemeanants. See Zero Tolerance for Domestic Abusers Act,
H.R.3130, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr3130/BILLS-
114hr3130ih.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2JJ-XYYQ]; Protecting Domestic Violence and
Stalking Victims Act of 2015, S. 1520, 114th Cong. (2015) , https://www.congress.gov/
114/bills/s1520/BILLS-114s1520is.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BE8-MF3H].
80 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (2012); Voisine v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016); United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014).
81 Notably, Justice Sotomayor is the only justice currently on the Court to have
been a trial court judge and have significant experience with the criminal justice system
as a Manhattan Assistant District Attorney. Rachel E. Barkow, Justice Sotomayor and
Criminal Justice in the Real World, 123 YALE L.J. F. 409, 409–10 (2014).
82 Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1414–15 (quoting Tenn. Code. Ann. § 39–13–111b
(Supp. 2002)).
83 Id. at 1409 (“Castleman moved to dismiss the § 922(g)(9) charges, arguing
that his Tennessee conviction did not qualify as a ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence’ because it did not ‘ha[ve], as an element, the use . . . of physical force,’
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).”).
84 Id.
85 See Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2272, 2276.
86 Id. at 2277.
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statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court upheld Voisine’s
conviction.87 Since the force clause does not specify the mental
state required of a predicate misdemeanor conviction, each
decision has necessarily addressed how federal law can address
differences between state criminal codes.88 Thus, as these
holdings have led to a circuit split among lower courts,89 the
solution must be decided with a broad brush.
1. Statutory Interpretation: Determining the Meaning
of “Use of Force”
In order to further evaluate the interpretation of the
Lautenberg Amendment’s force clause, the Supreme Court had
to determine what exactly constituted a “use” of force.90 In
Castleman, a man previously convicted under Tennessee
battery law of “‘intentionally . . . caus[ing] bodily injury to’ the
mother of his child,” argued that this conviction was for a
nonviolent misdemeanor.91 When he was later found “selling
firearms on the black market,” Castleman was indicted under
the Lautenberg Amendment’s possession ban.92 He argued that
under a common law reading of the Tennessee assault statute,
his predicate misdemeanor did not contain an element of
“violent force,” and thus did not trigger the Lautenberg
Amendment charge.93 His previous conviction, he argued, was
an act of “offensive touching,” and “not an act of violence within
the meaning” of the law.94
Significantly, Castleman’s reasoning relied heavily on a
previous firearm dispossession case unrelated to domestic
violence, United States v. Johnson (Johnson I). Rejecting
principles of common law in favor of a contextual reading, the
Johnson I Court ruled that the “physical force” element meant
87 Id. at 2280–81. Yet, the two courts differed in an important sense: the
Castleman court used the modified categorical approach, whereas the Voisine Court did
not. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1414 (“We may accordingly apply the modified categorical
approach . . . .”); Voisine, 126 S. Ct. at 2278 (“Statutory text and background alike lead
us to conclude . . . .”). In the ACCA context, however, courts are required to apply either
the categorical approach or the modified categorical approach, depending on whether or
not the statute is divisible, when looking at predicate crimes. United States v. Taylor,
272 F. Supp. 3d 127, 137 (D.D.C. 2017); see also infra Part IV.
88 See Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2280–81; Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1412–13.
89 Compare Bennett v. United States, No. 1:16-CV-251-GZS, 2016 WL
3676145, at *3 (D. Me. July 6, 2016) (order granting motion for relief), with United
States v. Fogg, 836 F.3d 951, 956 (8th Cir. 2016).
90 See Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2278.
91 Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1409.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Lininger, supra note 9, at 186.
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violent force, and that a simple offensive touch, such as a slap,
would not suffice as a predicate battery charge in the context of
the ACCA.95 Finding Johnson I’s reasoning persuasive, the
Castleman Court still reached the opposite conclusion—that
the common law meaning of the “use of force” was applicable
because the difference in context between domestic violence
and the ACCA.96 Finding that although “‘violence’ standing
alone ‘connotes a substantial degree of force,’” as in Johnson I,
Justice Sotomayor found that the same is “not true of domestic
violence.”97 Domestic violence, the Court noted, can be “a
squeeze of an arm,” or an “accumulation of such acts over time
[that] can subject one intimate partner to the other’s control.”98
The Court, by using this language, is making a sweeping
acknowledgement and adoption of the language of domestic
violence advocates.99 Justice Scalia’s concurrence, reading often
like a dissent, signaled dissatisfaction that the Court was now
adopting a broad rule recognizing that domestic violence is
different than other types of violence, and encompasses too broad
an array of conduct.100 Yet, the Castleman holding serves as an
important step forward for domestic violence advocates and was
widely celebrated as a decision that “sav[ed] women’s lives.”101
The Supreme Court extended its Castleman reading of
the “use of force” in the case of Voisine v. United States.102
Unlike the Castleman defendant, who was indicted under an
assault statute that included only “intentional” or “knowing”
actions, Voisine’s state conviction occurred under an assault
statute that also included “reckless” actions, a mental state
deemed significantly less culpable.103 The Court sought to
resolve whether a reckless use of force in an assault statute
was sufficient to fulfill the requisite misdemeanor crime
95 Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 139–40 (2010) (Johnson I).
96 See Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1411–12 (“Johnson [I] resolves this case in the
Government’s favor—not, as the Sixth Circuit held, in Castleman’s.”).
97 Id. at 1411.
98 Id. at 1412.
99 Id.
100 Wesley M. Oliver, Domestic Violence, Gun Possession, and the Importance
of Context, 90 IND. L.J. SUPP. 36, 37–38 (2015) (arguing that the Castleman decision is
best read not as a strict statutory interpretation, but as a public welfare decision); see
Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1418 (Scalia, J., concurring).
101 Lininger, supra note 9 at 187 (“The White House issued a press release
expressing confidence in the efficacy of the Castleman ruling: ‘[t]his week the Supreme
Court decided a case that will save women’s lives.’”).
102 Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2278 (2016).
103 Id. Additionally, even if Voisine’s predicate domestic assault crime was not
undertaken with a reckless mental state, in Mathis v. United States, the Court found
that where a state law includes several mental states, the law is “assumed to
encompass all of them.” Little, supra note 19.
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necessary to trigger the Lautenberg Amendment’s possession
ban.104 Instead of looking to the common law definition of the
“use of force,” which did not include “recklessness . . . in the [ ]
standard lexicon,”105 Justice Kagan’s opinion almost directly
adopts the language of the Model Penal Code’s definition of
recklessness.106 Regardless of the Voisine Court’s use of the
common law, context, or Model Penal Code, the same principles
of its Castleman decision underlie its conclusion: the specific
context of domestic violence requires a broad interpretation of
the Lautenberg Amendment.107
The Court’s opinion in Voisine accords with its “nuanced
understanding of domestic violence.”108 To illustrate, the
difference between the “use of force” in a traditional context
compared to a domestic one, the Court pointed to the idea of a
“soapy hand[ed]” husband who throws a plate with the intent to
scare, but not injure, his wife.109 The action of throwing the plate
is a “‘use’ of force,” but it is a reckless action that could rise to an
assault if the plate shatters and subsequently injures the wife.110
Thus, by looking at the context of domestic violence to be one of
both emotional and physical coercion, the “use” of force takes on
a different meaning to include reckless conduct.111
Yet, Justice Sotomayor notably joined Justice Thomas’
dissent with regard to the statutory interpretation issue.112
This portion of his dissent focused on the overbroad statutory
reading as contrary to Supreme Court precedent that has never
understood the “use of physical force” to be any actions beyond
intentional or knowledgeable.113 Justice Sotomayor’s change,
from majority writer to dissenter, has been the subject of much
curiosity among academics, and could be based in her extensive
104 Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2276–78; see also Amy Howe, Court grants review in
firearm-possession case, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 30, 2015, 4:19 PM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2015/10/court-grants-review-in-firearm-possession-case/ [https://perma.cc/
G5NF-PB63] (noting that Voisine’s case was joined with an appeal by William
Armstrong, similarly convicted in Maine).
105 Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2281.
106 See id. at 2278; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
The American Legal Institute, a collection of scholars and practitioners, began developing
the Model Penal Code in the 1960s in order to urge states to adopt more uniform criminal
laws. The Model Penal Code sets out a scale of culpable mental states, or mens rea,
making “purposeful” or “intentional” crimes the most culpable. Wayne R. LeFave,
Criminal Law: Hornbook Series, West Academic Publishing, § 5.1(c) (6th Ed. 2017).
107 Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2278–79; see also Little, supra note 19.
108 Sack, supra note 26, at 129–31.
109 Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2279.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 2282–90 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
113 Id. at 2287.
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knowledge and firsthand experience within the realm of
criminal law.114 It is far from clear whether Justice Sotomayor
dissented because of concern of overbreadth of application or
because she wanted the majority to consistently apply the
common law reading used in Castleman. As a justice with
significant experience on both the district and circuit courts,115
it is possible she had an awareness of the mens rea interpretive
spillover likely to result in the ACCA. What is clear is that the
Voisine holding has led to a problem of application—discussed
in Part III below.
2. Congressional Intent
Next, both the Castleman and Voisine courts looked to
congressional history and intent, to find if “Congress meant to
incorporate that misdemeanor-specific meaning of ‘force’ in
defining a ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.’”116 Citing
Hayes, the Castleman Court again reiterated that excluding
reckless conduct would render the Lautenberg Amendment
inoperative.117 In a world where domestic abusers are routinely
prosecuted under laws that penalize intentional offensive
touching, Congress enacted the law with the clear intent to
prohibit all domestic violence offenders from owning a
firearm—not just some of them.118 Additionally, evident
congressional intent to capture a wide amount of conduct and
differences within state criminal laws also guide the Voisine
decision.119 Where many state laws include “recklessness” within
their assault statutes, to find this mens rea inapplicable would
be to make the Lautenberg Amendment “broadly inoperative” in
thirty-five jurisdictions.120 Instead, the Court chose to expand
the scope of the amendment, providing clarity and reviving a
statute meant to protect victims of domestic violence.121
114 See Barkow, supra note 81, at 409–10.
115 See id.
116 United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1411 (2014); see also Voisine,
136 S. Ct. at 2280–81.
117 Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1413.
118 See id.
119 See Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2279–80.
120 Id. at 2278–80; see e.g., United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 238, 256, 9 L.Ed.
113 (1835) (Story, J.) (“Congress must be presumed to have legislated under this
known state of the laws.”).
121 See Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2280.
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III. THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT’S FORCE CLAUSE IN
OTHER CONTEXTS
The Court’s opinions interpreting the “use of force” has
been largely based on context,122 leading lower courts to wrestle
with difficult questions of when the predicate statute at issue
in the case is not related to domestic violence. One such
example is the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The ACCA
also requires the use of predicate convictions and contains a
similarly worded force clause—requiring the earlier crime to
have as an element the “use or attempted use of physical
force.”123 Yet, the ACCA is borne out of a different purpose and
effectuates a very different outcome than the Lautenberg
Amendment.124 Across the country, prosecutors are arguing
that Voisine’s holding that reckless conduct falls within the
definition of a “use of force” dictates that a range of conduct
previously thought unregulated by the ACCA now falls within
its purview.125 Although in a footnote the Voisine Court
expressly demurred on the application of its holding to the
ACCA’s force clause, the Court stated that there may be a
“divergent reading[ ] .”126 Yet, the Court’s unclear approach to
the question of reckless convictions under the ACCA and the
escalating circuit split make one thing clear: the Supreme
Court is likely to see this question again.
A. The ACCA Sentence Enhancement
Another section of the Gun Control Act, the ACCA
subjects a defendant charged with being a felon in possession of
a firearm to an enhanced sentence if he has at least three prior
convictions.127 These three prior convictions would have to fall
under one of two categories: either a drug offense or a violent
122 See generally id. at 2281–82.
123 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), with 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).
124 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
125 See United States v. Fogg, 836 F.3d 951, 956 (8th Cir. 2016); United States
v. Middleton, 883 F.3d 485, 499–500 (4th Cir. 2018) (Floyd J., concurring).
126 Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2280 n.4; see also Middleton, 883 F.3d at 498 (Floyd
J., concurring). To note, the Court in Leocal v. Ashcroft ruled that an underlying felony
conviction, if proffered to constitute a “crime of violence” in a deportation proceeding,
could not be conducted with merely “negligent or even inadvertent” conduct. Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004). The Voisine Court called upon Justice Rehnquist’s
discussion of the word “use” in Leocal to support its assertion in footnote four that
different statutes may require divergent readings.
127 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) criminalizes possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
whose sentence is then enhanced if the felon is found to be a “career criminal” under the
ACCA. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). See Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 136 (2010)
(Johnson I); see also Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555 (2015) (Johnson II).
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felony.128 A violent felony must then fall under one of two
categories: it either must be encompassed in a list of enumerated
crimes (the enumerated clause),129 or be a felony that “has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another,” (the force clause).130 The
ACCA provides for a minimum sentence of fifteen years
imprisonment, whereas a violation of the Lautenberg Amendment
provides for a maximum of ten years imprisonment.131
In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled in Johnson I that an
underlying felony conviction, if proffered to enhance someone’s
sentence under the ACCA, must contain an element of “violent
force.”132 Looking to both the context and purpose of the force
clause, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion concludes that mere
physical force—for example, a slap on the wrist—would not
suffice for the sentence enhancement.133 Instead, the violence
must be “a substantial degree of force.”134 Scalia’s evaluation of
the context surrounding the “use of force,” leads to his
conclusion that since the ACCA sought to punish violent
felonies, the force element of the underlying conviction must
also contain a degree of violent force.135
The Court also concluded in Johnson I that the ACCA’s
purpose in targeting felonies did not necessarily apply to other
sections of the Gun Control Act that targeted misdemeanor
crimes.136 Specifically, in referencing the Lautenberg
Amendment, Justice Scalia noted that “the context of defining
128 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
129 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (The enumerated felonies subject to the
ACCA enhancement are “burglary, arson, or extortion, [as well as any crime that]
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.”).
130 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The ACCA used to involve a third category
called the “residual clause” which read that a violent felony could be anything
“otherwise involve[ing] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.” The residual clause was overruled as vague in Johnson II. Johnson II, 135
S. Ct. at 2555–57.
131 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). See generally Harvard Law Review
Association, Armed Career Criminal Act-Residual Clause-Johnson v. United States,
129 HARV. L. REV. 301 (2015) (discussing the Johnson II opinion that invalidated the
residual clause section of the ACCA, not at issue in this paper); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 924
(a)(2) (“Whoever knowingly violates subsection . . . (g) . . . of section 922 shall be fined
as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”).
132 See Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 140–41.
133 Oliver, supra note 100, at 37 (“In Johnson [I], [the term ‘physical force’] was
used to define violent felony; inCastleman, it was used to define an act of domestic violence.”).
134 Id.
135 Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 140–41.
136 See id. at 143–44 (“We have interpreted the phrase ‘physical force’ only in
the context of a statutory definition of ‘violent felony.’ We do not decide that the phrase
has the same meaning in the context of defining a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence. The issue is not before us, so we do not decide it.” (emphasis in original)).
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a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” was not before the
Court—a premise that, as written, might lead to a very
different conclusion.137 By looking to the divergent purposes of
the statute, the Court cast aside the government’s contention
that interpreting “physical force” to only mean “violent force”
would additionally weaken the Lautenberg Amendment to only
include misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence that have an
element of exclusively “violent force.”138 Since the context of
domestic violence is wholly separate from the context of career
criminal, the Court stressed that its interpretation did not
extend to the domestic violence context, as that issue was not
before the Court.139
B. Current Circuit Split: Similar Clause, Different Context
Given the “confusing backdrop of recent precedents,”140
it is no wonder that lower courts across the country are
unevenly applying Voisine to ACCA cases. From this backdrop,
a divergence has emerged: circuits that are willing to extend
Voisine’s reckless mens rea standard to predicate violent
felonies for the ACCA, and those that are not.141
A court reviewing a predicate felony under the ACCA
must apply the categorical or modified categorical approach,
whereas the same precedent does not necessarily bind a court
looking at a Lautenberg Amendment case.142 To avoid
relitigating the prior conviction, the categorical approach
requires a court, seeking to review potentially qualifying
convictions, to look exclusively to the elements of the
underlying crime, and none of the facts.143 This difference of
review—looking exclusively at the elements versus looking at
the underlying facts and context—affects the depth of a court’s
analysis of the underlying conduct.
Courts are now using the categorical approach in one of
two ways: to find either that the ACCA context is wholly
137 Id. (emphasis in original).
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 Bennett v. United States, No. 1:16-CV-251-GZS, 2016 WL 3676145, at *4
(D. Me. July 6, 2016).
141 Although I have sought to conduct a thorough look at the recent and ever-
increasing number of federal court decisions discussing Voisine in the context of the
ACCA sentencing enhancement, I do not contend that this note is a complete list of
cases addressing this issue.
142 United States v. Taylor, 272 F. Supp. 3d 127, 137 (D.D.C. 2017); see also
the discussion at supra note 74 for the Court’s rejection of the categorical approach in
the Lautenberg Amendment jurisprudence in United States v. Hayes.
143 See Sharpless, supra note 73, at 1279.
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different from the Lautenberg Amendment context and thus a
reckless mens rea in the original conviction is inapplicable or
alternatively that in light of Voisine, reckless convictions can
qualify as a “use of force” and are now eligible for the ACCA
enhancement. This note argues that courts within the former
category appropriately cabin the Voisine decision to the
domestic violence context whereas courts within the latter
category are misapplying Voisine to qualify felony convictions
that are violent in nature, but still contain a reckless mens rea.
This misapplication, although sensible given the seriousness of
the crimes at issue, could easily lead to the “comical misfit”144 of
disproportionate punishment not befitting the crime and must
be congressionally addressed.
1. District Courts in the First, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits
Circumscribe Voisine, and the Fourth Circuit Seems
Poised to Follow Suit
Looking critically at the context and purpose of the
statutory language, several district courts have found that a
reckless conviction does not satisfy the “use of force” element
required of a violent felony under the ACCA. In Bennett v.
United States, a district court in the First Circuit rejected the
government’s assertion that Voisine applied outside of the
context of domestic violence.145 In Bennett, the petitioner
challenged his ACCA conviction, arguing that three of his prior
convictions did not qualify as violent felonies.146 Because his
convictions for aggravated assault were considered “reckless”
crimes, Bennett argued they were not “violent” for the purposes
of the sentence enhancement.147 Siding with the defendant,
Judge Singal found that to label a defendant an “Armed Career
Criminal,” for a reckless action would be a “comical misfit,” for
the purposes of the law.148 The district court in Bennett became
one of the first examples of a court rejecting the government’s
argument that Voisine’s reckless mens rea misdemeanor
standard should extend to the elements of a violent felony for
the purpose of the ACCA.149
144 Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 145 (2010) (Johnson I).
145 Bennett, 2016 WL 3676145, at *3–4.
146 Id. at *1.
147 See id. at *2.
148 Id. *3–4 (quoting Johnson I).
149 The First Circuit later upheld, but under rule of lenity grounds, the district
court’s decision in Bennett v. United States, 868 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017). Bennett died
before the decision was issued, however, and the opinion was withdrawn and vacated.
See Bennett v. United States, 870 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2017). The First Circuit later
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Several district courts within other circuits followed
suit. In 2017, courts within the Sixth and D.C. Circuits also
disagreed with government arguments that crimes with
reckless mens rea qualify for the violent felony enhancement in
accordance with Voisine. In United States v. Taylor, Judge
Kollar-Kotelly of the D.C. district court noted that whether a
violent felony can be “reckless” for the purposes of the ACCA
was an “open issue in th[e] jurisdiction.”150 After a thorough
evaluation of precedent, the court found that “divergent
readings” of the required mens rea within the force clauses of
both statutes—the ACCA and the Lautenberg Amendment—
were warranted.151 Since a defendant’s sentencing enhancement
under the ACCA is based on prior felony convictions, Congress
likely did not intend for the same level of culpability as that
required of a misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence.152 A
mere “linguistic similarity” was not enough, per Judge Kollar-
Kotelly, to expand the categories of mens rea culpability for a
substantially different purpose.153 Her Taylor decision notes the
novelty of this inquiry, and expressly cites to Bennett to note the
agreement among sister courts.154
Following the same analytical lines, a court within the
Sixth Circuit has come to the same result. In United States v.
Wehunt, Judge Mattice of the Eastern District of Tennessee was
similarly unconvinced that Voisine overruled previous Sixth
Circuit case law.155 Again citing the district court in Bennett, the
Wehunt court refused to extend Voisine’s more expansive
reading of a “crime of violence” to a context outside of domestic
violence.156 As judges around the country are faced with a lack of
upheld their Bennett reasoning to the same question at issue in United States v.
Windley, 864 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2017).
150 See United States v. Taylor, 272 F. Supp. 3d 127, 144 (D.D.C. 2017).
151 See id. at 145–46.
152 Id. at 146.
153 Id. at 145–46.
154 See id. at 145. The Taylor court also cites to the earlier D.C. district court
case United States v. Brown, 249 F. Supp. 3d 287, 298 (D.D.C. 2017). In Brown, Judge
Sullivan ruled on a felony that included a negligent mental state, in addition to a
reckless one—but included a thoughtful discussion of the Voisine holding. Id. In
looking at Voisine’s applicability to the ACCA context, Judge Sullivan comes to this
ultimate conclusion: “Among the various well-reasoned justifications [ ] courts have
already articulated for not understanding Voisine to mean that recklessness is a
sufficient mens rea in the context of ACCA’s elements clause, the Court finds
particularly persuasive the fact that the ‘Supreme Court had previously defined terms
that are used identically in the ACCA and the Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Act to
have different meanings.’” Id. (citations omitted).
155 See United States v. Wehunt, 230 F. Supp. 3d 838, 846–47 (E.D. Tenn. 2017).
156 Id. at 847–48 (“Finally, the Court is persuaded by the Bennett court’s
finding that extending Voisine to the case at bar would lead to a ‘comical misfit,’ in
which ‘three past convictions for injuries that result from reckless plate throwing (the
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Supreme Court guidance and a developing circuit split, many
are unwilling to extend the mens rea holding from Voisine.
Lastly, in United States v. Middleton, the Fourth
Circuit, while not ruling precisely on this issue, signaled that it
is poised to join the debate. In Middleton, Judge Gregory
determined that a prior conviction for involuntary
manslaughter did not qualify as a violent felony for the
purposes of the ACCA, over the government’s argument that
using Castleman would allow a different reading.157 The court
noted the divergent Supreme Court readings of the force clause
in the Lautenberg Amendment compared to the ACCA.158
Notably, in his concurrence, Judge Floyd carefully analyzed the
application of Voisine and the Court’s domestic violence
jurisprudence within the ACCA context.159 Judge Floyd
observed that “the ACCA does not share the same purpose as
the [Lautenberg Amendment],” by seeking to go beyond the
context of domestic violence and “target[ ] the truly purposeful
and aggressive criminals.” Because of this purpose, he
concludes, the ACCA “warrants a narrower reading of the word
‘use’” within the force clause.160 Judge Floyd’s concurrence
signals that the “divergent contexts and purposes” of the two
statutes are critical to his conclusion that a reckless mens rea
does not suffice for the ACCA’s force clause and places the
Fourth Circuit on one side of this circuit split.161
2. The Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits Extend Voisine
The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have sharply
diverged from other circuits to find that Voisine’s inclusion of a
reckless mens rea in a “crime of violence” should suffice as a
predicate for an ACCA enhancement. Instead of looking to the
context and purposes of the ACCA compared with the
Lautenberg Amendment, these courts look to the similarity in
phrasing and the degree of violence in the conviction at issue.
Noting the identical phrasing of the force clause of the ACCA
example discussed at length in Voisine), or reckless driving, could be sufficient to earn
a designation as an armed career criminal.’”).
157 United States v. Middleton, 883 F.3d 485, 487–88 (4th Cir. 2018).
158 Id. at 490 (“Although the definitions of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence and a violent felony under the ACCA both contain the term ‘physical force,’ the
Supreme Court has interpreted those terms differently. In Castleman, the Court
applied the common-law definition of force—‘namely, offensive touching’—to the term
‘physical force’ in § 921(a)(33)(A).” (citations omitted)).
159 See id. at 497–500.
160 Id. at 499.
161 Id. at 499–500.
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and the Lautenberg Amendment, in United States v. Fogg the
Eighth Circuit ruled that a reckless crime could suffice to
trigger the ACCA.162 Previously convicted of “first degree
manslaughter, simple robbery and [an] attempted drive by
shooting,” the defendant faced an enhanced sentence under the
ACCA when he was later arrested carrying an illegal firearm.163
He appealed the enhancement, arguing that his predicate
conviction for the attempted drive-by shooting (or “reckless
discharge of a firearm”) did not qualify as a “violent felony”
under the ACCA.164 The Minnesota statute “only criminalize[d]
reckless conduct as opposed to that which is intentional or
purposeful,” and thus, Fogg argued, this language was
insufficient to trigger the statutory enhancement.165
In a case of first impression where no Supreme Court
precedent directly ruled that reckless discharge of a firearm
constituted a violent felony under the ACCA force clause, the
Eighth Circuit looked to the recent Voisine opinion.166 Since the
Supreme Court’s Voisine analysis reviewed a “similarly worded
force clause,” the same reasoning could be imported in the case
at bar, because both cases discuss “crimes of violence.”167 Where
the Supreme Court found that reckless conduct could
constitute a “use of force” under the Lautenberg Amendment, it
could also constitute a “use of force” under the ACCA.168 Thus,
Fogg’s conviction for the drive-by shooting would be considered
a “violent felony” for the purposes of his conviction and
enhanced sentencing under the ACCA.169 The Tenth Circuit,
also reviewing a reckless shooting felony conviction, reached a
similar conclusion.170
The Fifth Circuit, in the United States v. Howell, echoed
the Eighth Circuit in deciding that the mental state of
recklessness was sufficient to qualify under the ACCA.171 Judge
Owens noted that the underlying assault conviction constituted
162 United States v. Fogg, 836 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2016).
163 Id. at 953.
164 Id. at 956.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id; see also Holman v. United States, 1:12CR72-1, 1:14CV549, 2016 WL
6304727, at *13 (M.D. N.C. 2016) (where a Fourth Circuit district court found that
assault and battery with a dangerous weapon fell under the ACCA’s violent felony
definition). Cf. United States v. Parnell, 818 F.3d 974, 981 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016) (decided prior
to Voisine, holding that a conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon which
contains a recklessness mens rea did not fall into the violent felony definition).
170 United States v. Pam, 867 F.3d 1191, 1208 (10th Cir. 2017).
171 See United States v. Howell, 838 F.3d 489, 501 (5th Cir. 2017).
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a crime of violence, whether or not it involved a reckless mens
rea in the definition.172 By looking at the underlying crime in
depth, Judge Owens conducted her own evaluation of the mens
rea of the crime to find that a reckless interpretation was still,
clearly, a violent one.
IV. A CLEAR APPROACH TO AMUDDLED PROBLEM:
IMPORTINGMENS REA REQUIREMENTS INTO THE
LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT
The divergence in lower court rulings require immediate
legislative redress. As a starting point, the Supreme Court’s
rulings on domestic violence issues have consistently
emphasized an overarching theme: practical considerations
must govern.173 Words like “violence” can mean something
entirely different within the framework of “domestic violence,”
and must be interpreted that way.174 By interpreting the
Lautenberg Amendment as broadly applicable to a variety of
underlying misdemeanor crimes,175 the Court has validated
over fifty years of domestic violence advocates’ work by
importing their language and understanding into a key
dispossession regime. In doing so, the Court has acted
discretely with regards to other federal criminal statutes, and
has made it clear that the statute’s definitional language only
applies to domestic violence cases.176 As federal district and
circuit courts across the country are faced with arguments
applying the Voisine holding to federal criminal statutes with
similar statutory language, in the absence of another Supreme
Court decision, legislative action is necessary. The “comical
misfit” of applying the Lautenberg Amendment-required mens
rea to violent felonies, as the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
have done, must be legislatively addressed.
172 Id. at 490–91.
173 See United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 426 (2009) (“Practical
considerations strongly support our reading of § 921(a)(33)(A)’s language.”).
174 United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1411 (2014).
175 See Snyder, supra note 1.
176 See Castleman 134 S. Ct. at 1411–13 (distinguishing Johnson I’s definition
of “use of force” clause in the Gun Control Act); Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2279–80.
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A. Clarification of the Force Clause Comports with
Statutory Interpretation Principles
Prior to the decision in Voisine, enforcement of the
Lautenberg Amendment remained low.177 Whether the decision
in Voisine changes enforcement patterns remains to be seen.178
Unfortunately, since the Voisine holding is already being
applied in a variety of ways by lower courts,179 it is possible that
prosecutors may be unsure of what they can charge against a
defendant until the scope is clarified.
Congress should respond to lower courts’ misapplication
by adding additional language to the definitional section of the
Lautenberg Amendment.180 By amending the force clause,
Congress could apply the principles that have been shown to
work in the domestic violence context, and add additional
language clarifying the clause’s application. After Section
921(a)(33)(A)(ii), Congress should add clarification language
that reads:
(iii) the use or attempted use of physical force is defined as a
reckless, knowledgeable, or intentional acts, or any common law
definition contained or similar hereto, and this definition is exclusive
to misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence.
Whether reckless misdemeanors should qualify in the
contexts of other federal criminal statutes should be up to
separate judicial or congressional inquiries.181 As noted above,
the strength and clarity afforded to the Lautenberg Amendment
should be irrespective of other criminal laws. Although the
Supreme Court has already interpreted the mens rea
requirement of the Lautenberg Amendment’s force clause in
Voisine and Castleman, congressional approval of a statute that
177 Lininger, supra note 65 at 531–32; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GUN CONTROL: ANALYZING AVAILABLE DATA COULD HELP IMPROVE
BACKGROUND CHECKS INVOLVING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RECORDS 11–14 (2016),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678315.pdf [https://perma.cc/FFE5-4RXJ].
178 See Lininger, supra note 9, at 187–88.
179 See Laura Lee Gildengorin, Smoke and Mirrors: How Current Firearm
Relinquishment Laws Fail to Protect Domestic Violence Victims, 67 HASTINGS L.J.
807, 819 (2016).
180 See Nora Caplan-Bricker, The Supreme Court Upheld the Law Against
Domestic Abusers Owning Guns. If Only Someone Would Enforce It, SLATE: THE XX
FACTOR BLOG (June 27, 2016), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2016/06/27/
in_voisine_scotus_says_domestic_abusers_can_t_have_guns.html [https://perma.cc/9EPY-
3BPF].
181 See, e.g., United States v. Fogg, 836 F.3d 951, 953 (8th Cir. 2016); Bennett
v. United States, No. 1:16-CV-251-GZS, 2016 WL 3676145, at *3 (D. Me. July 6, 2016).
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narrows its application to domestic violence contexts will avoid
“the dangers of excessive federalization of the criminal law.”182
B. The Impracticability of Legislative Inaction
As it stands, the Supreme Court is stuck with
interpreting sections of the Gun Control Act on a case-by-case
basis.183 Previous decisions have noted the Court is “tired” of
resolving these types of issues ad hoc, finding them
“bothersome.”184 Although Congress can find adding a “list” of
applicable statutes impracticable, it must be clearer as to when
it wants specific interpretations of the law to apply.185
Furthermore, given the highly contextual reading that
the Supreme Court has given the Lautenberg Amendment
when compared with the ACCA, it is up to Congress to import
some of this language into the statute. To allow for disjunctive
readings without legislative clarity only confuses lower courts
further, and requires more research in order to make sure that
they are making decisions only after doing substantial research
that could be otherwise more efficiently applied.
CONCLUSION
As the advocate Bryan Stevenson notes, “the true
measure of our commitment to justice . . . cannot be measured
by how we treat the rich, the powerful, the privileged. The true
measure of our character is how we treat the poor, the
disfavored, the accused, the incarcerated, and the
condemned.”186 When the Castleman Court says that a “squeeze
of the arm” can be a battery, or the Voisine Court allows for
punishment of soapy-handed partner throwing plates at his
182 Note,Mens Rea in Federal Criminal Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2402, 2402 (1998).
183 See Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016); Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (Johnson II); United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405
(2014); Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 136 (2010) (Johnson I); United States v.
Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009).
184 See Johnson II, 135 S. Ct. at 2573–74 (Alito, J., dissenting) (invalidating
the residual clause of the ACCA for vagueness concerns, after several recent decisions
went back-and-forth on the application of the clause).
185 See generally United States v. Tavares, 843 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) (“In a
sensible world, Congress and/or the Sentencing Commission would have made a list of
state and federal laws deemed to be crimes of violence that warranted the desired
penalties and sentencing enhancements. At its margins, such a list might be over-or
under-broad. It would, though, be straightforward. Instead of using a simple list, the
drafters adopted abstract descriptions of the crimes that would appear on such a list,
employing terms such as ‘physical force,’ ‘use,’ ‘injury,’ and so on.”).
186 BRYANSTEVENSON, JUSTMERCY:ASTORYOFJUSTICEANDREDEMPTION 18 (2014).
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spouse to scare her,187 the justice system is recognizing the
plight of those who are too often coerced to remain quiet. The
resulting contextual interpretation of the Lautenberg
Amendment has allowed for a significantly broad reading of the
mens rea requirement, which strengthens prosecutors’ ability
to dispossess domestic abusers of their guns. But this
interpretation should not be extended to the violent crime
context; the risk of over-sentencing is too great. In response to
this split among the circuits, Congress must continue to define
and recognize the parameters of domestic violence and stop
interpretive spillover in the Gun Control Act.
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